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Congress exercises its power over the federal purse
and the Defense Budget through its budgetary process. This
thesis is part of a continuing effort to analyze the changing
role of Congress in Defense policy-making. The fiscal/
programmatic orientation of various Congressional committees
in relation to the Procurement and Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation portions of the Defense Budget is
determined through use of the research technique - Content
Analysis. The period of analysis includes fiscal years
1976 and 1977, the first two years to be affected by the
new Congressional budgetary process prescribed by the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
Individual committee decisions and comments were recorded
and categorized as fiscal or programmatic. It was concluded
that committee decisions concerning the Defense Budget were
fairly equally divided between a fiscal and programmatic
orientation. An extensive background section and description
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is part of a larger, on-going research
project for the purpose of furthering knowledge of the
changing role of Congress in Defense policy-making. It has
been recognized throughout American history that Congress 1
power over the "federal purse strings" has been its most
important lever to influence military policy. James
Madison, writing in The Federalist Papers , is quoted as
saying, "this power of the purse may, in fact, be regarded
as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any
country can arm the immediate representatives of the people
for obtaining a redress of every grievance and for carrying
into effect every just and salutary measure" [Ref. 33,
pp. 298-299].
Congress has attempted to exercise this power of the
purse through its budgetary processing of the Department of
Defense's annual budget. A continuing question concerning
the changing role of Congress in Defense policy-making has
been whether Congress makes its budgetary decisions on a
purely fiscal or on a broader programmatic basis. A 1973
article in the Naval War College Review by Lawrence J. Korb
contained an excellent discussion of the fiscal/programmatic
hypotheses [Ref. 21]. Korb defined the two as follows:
"The fiscal position, or hypothesis, implies
that Congress is primarily concerned with the
level of defense spending. If this hypothesis
is correct, then congressional action on the

defense budget would focus on eliminating waste
and inefficiencies and would take the form of
across-the-board reductions or extending spending
programs over longer periods. On the other
hand, the programmatic hypothesis infers that
Congress addresses the defense budget in policy
terms and uses its power of the purse as a tool
to influence the shape of defense programs. If
this hypothesis has validity then the Congress
would be concerned with such areas as the level
of the manpower in the armed services and the
type of weapons in the inventory" [Ref . 21, p. 50]
.
This thesis attempted to determine the fiscal/ programma-
tic orientation of congress toward the Defense Budget through
the use of a research technique known as Content Analysis.
The Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evalua-
tion (RDT&E) appropriation titles of the Defense Budget were
chosen for evaluation since several recent studies have indi-
cated that Congress has focused its attention on these two
areas [Refs. 18, 21, & 28]. Past research efforts have
selected to study a certain Congressional committee over
various time periods with the intent of determining whether
the overall trend of committee action toward the Defense
Budget was fiscal or programmatic [Refs. 23 & 4] . This study
took a somewhat different approach in that it attempted to
assess the fiscal/programmatic nature of the various committees
(i.e. House and Senate Armed Services, Appropriations and
Budget Committees) involved in the Defense budgetary process
during a certain time period. A comparison was made between
the committees and the overall orientation of Congress
determined. The time period chosen for evaluation was fiscal
10

years 1976 and 1977. These two years were chosen since they
were the first to be affected by the new Congressional
budgetary process prescribed by the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. This Act was a major
budgetary reform measure and a means by which Congress
reasserted its power of the purse.
In order to provide the reader with a better understand-
ing of the budgetary atmosphere and environment prevailing
at the time this study was conducted, an extensive back-
ground chapter is included. This chapter contains a brief
history of Congressional budgetary reform measures, the
Defense budgetary process prior to fiscal year 1976, the
major changes introduced by the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and a survey of budgetary
literature. Chapter III is a detailed synopsis of Content
Analysis. Readers familiar with this research technique
could omit this chapter without a loss in context. The
methodology of analysis and summary of findings are des-
cribed in Chapters IV and V, respectively. Chapter VI
includes conclusions drawn as to the fiscal/programmatic
orientation of Congress, assessed impact of the Congressional





A. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY REFORM MEASURES
The changing role of Congress in the budgetary process
is evident from a brief review of United States budget
history. Congress has not always been in firm control of
the federal purse strings, and its efforts to gain control
have often resulted in the breakdown of many reform measures.
«
With passage of the Treasury Act in 1789, President
Washington appointed Alexander Hamilton to the position of
Secretary of the Treasury. The first U.S. budget, developed
by Hamilton in 1789, was a single executive type budget
separated into only four major line items and totaled a
sum not to exceed $645,000 [Ref. 5, p. 34]. This process
was repeated in 1790 and 1791, but in 1792 Congress required
that items of expenditure be specified in greater detail
[Ref. 5, p. 36]. Hamilton complied with Congress' request
by submitting detailed budget estimates, but in actual
practice, he transferred funds between line items with a
free will. Since Hamilton did not provide Congress with
regular reports of Treasury expenditures, Congress seldom
knew where the funds were going [Ref. 30, pp. 50-51]
.
By 1796, Congress realized that the Secretary of the
Treasury, not Congress, actually controlled the budget.
In an attempt to gain power, Congress established a temporary
Committee on Ways and Means which was responsible for
12

handling both appropriations and revenues. This new
committee slowly began to gain control of the federal
purse.
During the administration of President Jefferson,
Congress established a permanent Ways and Means Committee.
The executive agencies presented their budget requests
directly to this House committee and, in so doing, virtually
eliminated direct Treasury influence in the preparation and
control of the nation's budget [Ref. 5, p. 61]. However,
the War and Navy Departments continued the illegal practice
of transferring funds. When Congress enacted legislation
to prevent these illegal fund transfers, the War and Navy
Departments adopted the practice of spending lapsed appro-
priations (unspent funds from previous years no longer
available for obligation) . In 1852 the War and Navy
Appropriations Acts further prohibited the transfer of
funds, and other acts imposed new restrictions on the use
of unspent funds. With these practices stymied, the
Services created deliberate deficiencies by entering into
contracts in advance of appropriations as a means of
circumventing Congressional controls [Ref. 60, p. 110].
In an attempt to further strengthen its controls over
spending by the Services, Congress created the following




1822 - Military Affairs 1816 - Military Affairs
(Armed Services*) (Armed Services*)
1822 - Naval Affairs 1816 - Naval Affairs
(Armed Services*) (Armed Services*)
1865 - Appropriations 1867 - Appropriations
* Name of present committee.
In 1906 Congress passed the Anti-Deficiency Act which,
despite some flaws, was the most substantial budget reform
bill enacted to date. Under its provisions, expenditures
in excess of appropriations were prohibited except for cases
in which contracts or obligations had previously been
authorized by law. The Act also provided for the apportion-
ment of appropriations by monthly or other allotments. The
Act erred in allowing the head of the executive agency the
discretionary authority to change the apportionment amount.
The apportionment procedure was abused and it was this
factor that caused the Act to fall short of its objective
of precluding the need for deficiency appropriations [Ref . 5]
.
Debate over control of the budget continued up until
passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 when con-
trol began to swing away from Congress and toward the Presi-
dency. This Act introduced three main provisions: (1) it
provided for a comprehensive Presidential budget, (2) it
established a Bureau of the Budget (later to become the
Office of Management and Budget) directly responsible to
the President to assist in formulation of the budget, and
14

(3) it created a General Accounting Office headed by the
Comptroller General and controlled by Congress. The
Bureau of the Budget staff of the President evolved into
a powerful and dynamic organization for which Congress had
no effective counterpart [Ref. 30, pp. 73-80].
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was certainly
the most comprehensive budgetary reform legislation ever
enacted. For the first time in history, the United States
had a budget process requiring formulation by the Presidnet,
authorization and appropriation by Congress, execution under
direction of the President, and an independent audit by the
General Accounting Office as a means of Congressional
review. Contemporary critics of the 1921 Act have asserted
that Congress itself yielded control over government spend-
ing to the President and that the period from 1921 was
marked by further erosion of Congressional influence in
budget-making decisions [Ref. 30, pp. 80-88].
Several other attempts for budgetary reform originated
in the 1940 's and 1950* s. The Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946 established a large joint Congressional committee
which was tasked to analyze the President's budget and then
formulate a separate legislative budget which would reflect
Congressional priorities. The concept was optimistically
received by both the House and Senate; however, it was
attempted only twice — in 1947 and 1948 without success in
either year. In 1947 Congress was never able to agree on
15

a budget ceiling. In 1948 a budget ceiling was established
but later ignored in actual spending practice. The proce-
dure remained inactive until it was repealed by the Reorgan-
ization Act of 1970 [Ref. 34, p. 3473].
Congress introduced an Omnibus Appropriations Bill in
1950. This action was an attempt to include all regular
appropriations in one bill. This approach was successful
in the sense that Congress completed its action on time,
but it lacked popular support in both the Legislative
and Executive Branches. It was consequently abandoned
after a one year trial [Ref. 34, p. 3474].
After 50 years of operating under a budget system estab-
lished by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Congress
recognized that its budgetary process still contained
numerous shortcomings. Significant shortcomings included
the following: (1) fragmentation of the appropriations
process, (2) unbalance in Presidential and Congressional
resources and support functions, (3) delays in funding,
(4) reprogramming or the use of funds for reasons other than
those intended by Congress, (5) a lag between the time when
funds were appropriated and when they were spent, (6) "back-
door spending" or spending routes other than through bills
considered by the appropriations committees, and (7) with
the increasing incidents of Presidential impoundment of
funds, it became painfully obvious to Congress that it
had lost control of the budget.
16

With the passage of Public Law 92-599 on October 27,
1972, Congress established a Joint Study Committee on Budget
Control and directed it to study the above weaknesses in
the budgetary process [Ref. 34, p. 3475]. A major budge-
tary reform measure, the Congressional Budget and Impound-
ment Control Act of 1974 (signed into law on July 12, 1974),
was a result of this Joint Committee study. The two main
objectives of this new reform measure were (1) to improve
the Congressional budget making process, and (2) to restore
to Congress its power of the purse.
B. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY PROCESSING OF DEFENSE BUDGET
Before discussing the reform measures contained in the
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, it is desirable
in the framework of this study that the reader be familiar
with the Congressional budgetary process as related to the
Defense Budget prior to the passage of this new Act.
The Defense Budget, which is part of the Presidential
Budget submitted to Congress in January of each year, is
the result of a formal 18 month effort under the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) [Ref. 32]. During
this formulation phase of the Defense Budget, there has
been a constant dialogue between the President, the Office
of Management and Budget, the various Military Services,
and Congress concerning program evaluations and budget
requests. Congress receives this Defense Budget and through
its authorization/appropriation review process can change,
17

eliminate, or even add new programs not requested by the
President. It can increase or decrease the amounts
recommended by the President to fund existing and proposed
new programs
.
Congressional review of the Defense Budget begins with
the authorization (approval of programs for which expendi-
tures are to be made) process in the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees [Ref . 26] . These committees
review those Defense requests subject to the authorization
process such as Military Construction; Procurement; Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation; and military and civilian
personnel end strengths. The House and Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committees conduct separate hearings on the Defense
Budget during which posture statements presented by witnesses
from the various Services are reviewed. Each committee
holds markup sessions in which any changes to the Defense
Budget request are made. The House and Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committees then draft separate authorization bills
and submit them to the respective House and Senate for
floor action and passage. Any disagreements in the two
bills are resolved by a joint conference committee composed
of members from the House and Senate. After final passage
by both houses and signing by the President, the Defense
Authorization Act is submitted to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees, specifically the Appropriations
Subcommittees on the Department of Defense, for use in
their review of appropriations requests.
18

The House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on
Defense deal with the appropriation (providing funds for
the programs approved by authorization) process [Ref . 26] .
In actual practice the House and Senate Appropriations
Subcommittees commence hearings on the Defense Budget similar
to those conducted by the Armed Services Committees prior
to receipt of the Authorization Act. The Appropriations
Subcommittees also review Defense appropriations that do
not require authorization. The sequence of events followed
in the appropriation process parallels that observed in the
authorization process. After hearings and markup sessions
are completed, a Defense Appropriation Bill is drafted and
passed by each house. Any differences in the two bills
are again resolved in a joint conference committee. The
appropriation process ends with final approval of the Con-
ference Report by both houses and signing by the President.
The final Department of Defense Appropriation Bill provides
for new obligational authority (NOA) for each budget request.
This NOA authorizes the Department of Defense to sign con-
tracts for the amount of the NOA at any time during the
obligational period associated with the budget category.
Since Congress normally receives the Defense Budget
request in late January, it has had only a little over five
months in which to complete its authorization/appropriation
process before the start of the new fiscal year in July.
A problem with Congress 1 budget procedure in the past has
been its inability to complete action on approval and
19

spending measures by the time the fiscal year begins. The
following tables illustrate the delays in passage of the
Defense Authorization Acts and Appropriation Bills for the
fiscal years 1969 through 1975 [Ref. 10, pp. 13-14].
Dates of Passage of the Defense Authorization Acts
Fiscal Year Date of Passage
1975 5 August 1974
1974 16 November 1973
1973 26 September 1972
1972 17 November 1971
1971 7 October 1970




Dates of Passage of the Defense Appropriation Bills
Fiscal Year Date of Passage
1975 8 October 1974
1974 2 January 1974
1973 26 October 1972
1972 18 December 1971
1971 11 January 1971




As may be noted, the dates of passage in each case
occurred well after the start of the new fiscal year on
1 July. It was therefore necessary that the Defense
20

Department operate under continuing resolutions. The
problem with this method of funding is that dollars are
being spent on programs that may not be approved, or that
may be approved at lesser levels thereby adversely affecting
the planned spending rates. This is just another incident
of Congress' lack of desired control over the budget.
This, along with the other budgetary shortcomings mentioned
earlier, led to the passage of the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
C. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974
Senator Charles H. Percy in reference to the Congress-
ional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 stated:
"The budget reform legislation represents
one of those historic turning points in
the evolution of our institution, a
reversal of the accelerating erosion of
the congressional power of the purse, a
reassertion of our correct role in the
American plan of government" [Ref. 15, p. 734].
This Act was indeed the most innovative budget reform
measure initiated by Congress since the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921. It is not the intent of this study to analyze
or describe in detail all the provisions of this Act. This
section will merely list the major changes to the Congressional
budget process to provide the reader with a better under-
standing of the existing environment in which this study
attempted to explain Congressional decisions affecting
the Defense Budget.
One of the major provisions of the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was the establishment of
21

new Budget Committees in the House and Senate with respon-
sibility for overseeing the entire budget making process
[Ref . 7] . The Budget Committees were not created to diminish
in any way the responsibilities or prerogatives of other
committees. Neither do they eliminate nor reduce the
importance of existing procedures for authorization of
programs or appropriation of funds. They were created to
perform new tasks related to establishing fiscal policy and
priorities, and in so doing, facilitate and complement the
functions of the existing committees. Included in the
responsibilities of the Budget Committees are (1) formu-
lating and reporting budget resolutions to their respective
houses and (2) recommending appropriate levels of federal
revenues, expenditures and debt service to include proposed
increases and decreases [Ref. 19, p. 7].
A second important provision was the creation of a
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) [Ref. 7] . When Congress
enacted the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, it provided
the President with a powerful analytical and budget formu-
lation capability, the Office of Management and Budget, but
made no provision for a counterbalance in Congress. The
CBO was designed to become that counterbalance. The primary
duty of the CBO is to assist the Budget Committees by pro-
viding information, data, and analyses. Assistance in
budgetary and budget related matters will be provided to
other committees upon request [Ref. 19, p. 7].
22

As was noted earlier, Congress has historically failed
to pass appropriation bills on time, and government agencies
have had to operate on continuing resolutions. In an
attempt to eliminate problems associated with this type of
situation, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 changed the fiscal year and established a new
Congressional budget schedule with specific milestone dates
and actions [Ref. 7]. Effective in fiscal year 1977, the
fiscal year runs from 1 October to 30 September. There was
a three month transition period from 1 July 1976 through
30 September 1976 to accomodate the shift from the old to
new fiscal year period. The new Congressional budget
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With the purpose of further strengthening Congress'
control over the budgetary process, the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 contains several other
sections that will not be discussed here such as (1) addi-
tional provisions to improve fiscal procedures, (2) amendments
to Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, (3) program review and
evaluation, (4) fiscal and budgetary information and
controls, and (5) impoundment control [Ref. 7].
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D. SURVEY OF LITERATURE
1. Various Research Techniques
Congress is obviously a complex organization as can
be seen from only a cursory examination of the multitude of
documents it publishes and from the volume of research that
has been conducted on this institution. Numerous studies
have been made in an attempt to analyze and categorize
Congressional budgetary decisions in defense as well as non-
defense areas. These studies have included elaborate
statistical methods, sociological characteristics, personal
interviews, comparative analysis and other quantitative
techniques. Individual committees as well as the entire
Congress have been examined to determine their impact on
spending. A review of some of the studies done at the
Naval Postgraduate School as part of the Congressional
Research Project follow.
In 1973 Joseph G. Terry, Jr. developed a methodology
for analyzing Congressional decision making based on the
then current Department of Defense (DOD) budgetary process
[Ref
. 31] . He suggested four linear, stochastic models for
testing Congressional decisions toward DOD budget requests.
These models were tested via a cross-sectional regression
analysis for Procurement and Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation in the 1970 - 1973 timeframe. Terry's results
employed the idea of a game theoretic approach to DOD
budgeting where both DOD and Congress act like opponents in
25

a two-player game and adjust their requests and appropri-
ations based on observation of each other's behavior.
James R. Capra's Ph.D. dissertation, published in
1974, is an intensive characterization of Congressional
appropriations for Defense Procurement and Research and
Development between 1953 and 1973 [Ref . 6] . In addition to
studying a longer time period, he used wider statistical
methods. His approach involved formulating alternative
models of appropriations as a percentage of requests and
deriving point and interval estimates for parameters using
robust statistical procedures. He concluded that decisions
of Congress affecting Procurement and Research and Develop-
ment changed considerably, starting in fiscal year 1969.
Following the lead of Terry and Capra, Stephen C. Wood in
1975 provided a detailed chronology of the Defense Budget
cycle with emphasis placed on the different roles played by
the Service branches, DOD, and Congress [Ref. 61] . He
studied DOD budgetary data for fiscal years 1953 - 1971 and
again used statistical linear regression analysis to evaluate
Congressional decision processes.
Robert C. Berry and Danial E. Peckham departed from
the statistical analysis approach in their 1975 study of
Congressional committee decisions and interactions between
Navy Program Managers [Ref. 3] . Their research was based on
telephone and written surveys, personal interviews with
Congressmen, Congressional staff members, Navy Program
26

Managers and other DOD personnel. Significant among their
findings were that the Armed Services Committees are becoming
quite expert in weaponry and individual weapon systems and
that Congressional committee staff work has a strong influ-
ence on decisions reached in the various committees. A
defense-oriented roll-call vote technique was employed by
Charles M. Rankin in 1973 [Ref . 27] . He used similarity
observations between 20 Senate defense votes during the
period 1969-1971 as inputs to a multi-dimensional scaling
computer program. The scaling solutions resulting from
this program showed that the most important dimensions in
explaining pro-defense voting were non-partisan/partisan
and foreign policy/domestic policy.
2. Fiscal/Programmatic Studies
A predominant theme running throughout the majority
of studies reviewed was whether Congress makes its budgetary
decisions on a purely fiscal basis or on a broader policy
or programmatic basis. Although most studies have supported
the fiscal hypothesis, there is some disagreement among
analysts in regard to Congress' fiscal/programmatic nature.
Richard F. Fenno, Jr. in the comprehensive work, The Power
of the Purse
, concentrated his study toward the Congressional
decisions made on the budgets of seven major non-defense
departments of the U.S. Government during the 16 year
period, 1947 to 1962 [Ref. 13] . All decisions analyzed
were decisions made regarding the original appropriations
request. Although he found that the dominant concern of
27

agency officials were programmatic, Congressional decisions
were made on a more fiscal or incremental pattern of non-
defense spending.
In his book, The Politics of the Budgetary Process
,
Aaron Wildavsky states that "Budgeting is treated as if it
were non-programmatic. Most committees view their work as
marginal, monetary adjustments to existing programs so that
the question of the ultimate desirability of most programs
arises only once in a while" [Ref. 59, p. 101]. Wildavsky
agrees with Fenno that Congress makes budget decisions on an
incremental, fiscal basis.
The research team of Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky
give further support to the fiscal hypothesis in their
article, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process" [Ref. 11]
.
They studied 56 non-defense agencies of the U.S. Government
during 1947 to 1963 in an attempt to establish a mathematical
model which would accurately predict the outcomes of the
Congressional budgetary process for each agency. Their
research led them to believe that Congressional decisions
can be represented by simple models which are stable over
periods of time, linear, and stochastic. They concluded
that the budgetary process has been based on incrementalism
and has been non-programmatic in nature.
Arnold Kanter, an advocate of the programmatic
hypothesis, has stated that even though most studies of the
budgetary process in non-defense areas have concluded that
Congress 1 orientation to appropriations is essentially
28

non-programmatic, it can not be automatically inferred that
Congress is disinclined to use its power over the Defense
Budget as an instrument to shape programs and policies.
Kanter's evaluation of Congress and the Defense Budget
during the period 1960 to 1970 concentrated on the authori-
zation/appropriation processes [Ref . 18] . His findings
demonstrated that Congressional activity among the disag-
gregated budget categories indicates a programmatic orienta-
tion toward the Defense Budget. He further concluded that
Congress is concerned about more than how much money is spent
and has evidenced a willingness and desire to influence the
nation's defense requirements as well as the content of
national security policy. An interesting illustration given
by Kanter portrays the programmatic thinking of Congress:
"Budget reductions also have been explained in
terms of the Congress's understanding of the
requirements of national security. Senator
Richard Russell articulated his uneasiness
about procuring the fast deployment logistics
(FDL) ships requested by the Johnson Administra-
tion: 'If we build anything like this, we are
just going to be handed more and more of this
business of fighting everybody's wars everwhere.
'
The belief that an increased ability to intervene
would result in greater U.S. intervention abroad
contributed to Congress's regular refusal to fund
the FDL's" [Ref. 18, pp. 136-137].
Arnold Kanter feels that the programmatic nature of Congress
will have the "greatest potential significance for defense
policy" [Ref. 18, p. 142].
In an attempt to resolve the fiscal/programmatic
question, Lawrence J. Korb studied the Congressional impact
upon the Defense Budget from fiscal years 1962 to 1973
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[Ref . 21] . His analysis dealt with new obligational
authority in four major appropriation categories:
(1) Personnel, (2) Operations and Maintenance, (3) Procure-
ment, and (4) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation.
Although admitting that the fiscal/programmatic question is
not easily answered, Korb concluded that Congressional
motivations in the Defense area are mostly fiscal.
Edward A. Kolodziej in his book, The Uncommon
Defense and Congress, 1945 - 1963 , investigated Congress
'
use of its power of the purse to influence military force
levels, weapons systems, and strategic policy [Ref. 20].
He describes how Congress has participated in shaping
defense policy and analyzes and evaluates the actual
decisions of Congress as they applied to the annual Defense
Budget. He based his studies primarily on the open record
of Congress as contained in the hearings, reports and floor
debates on the annual Defense appropriation bills. Kolodziej
was quite critical of Congress and argued that it should
assume a more positive, active, and informed role in strategic
policy, and, accordingly, that the effectiveness of U.S.
strategic and foreign policies could be improved. Kolodziej
stated that the decentralization and diffusion of power and
responsibility in Congress created a set of incentives that
oriented individual Congressmen and the Defense appropriations
committees away from a full programmatic review of the Defense
Budget. He claimed that most members were induced, first of
all, to choose the time honored rule of watchdog (fiscal
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hypothesis) of the public purse. Kolodziej further
criticized the fiscal approach of Congress to the Defense
appropriation bill by stating that Congress had found
itself out of joint with the requirements of policy that
are attuned to the nation's strategic imperatives and that
Congress had been slow to perceive the rapid social, poli-
tical, economic and technological changes occurring in the
world. He called for Congressional budgetary reform that
would lead to a redistribution of power and responsibility
in Congress and that would create a system of incentives
which would encourage a review and determination of the
Defense Budget in terms of (1) the policy goals that it
seeks to achieve, (2) its military and economic feasibility,
(3) its fiscal implications, and (4) its relation to other
strategic and non-strategic programs [Ref. 20, p. 529].
In his article based on 100 interviews, primarily
with members of Congressional committees having military
responsibility, and other leading Congressmen, a few commit-
tee staff members, administrative assistants, and legis-
lative liaison personnel from the Defense Department, Lewis
A. Dexter provides many interesting quotes that indicate
Congressional decisions lean more toward the fiscal hypothe-
sis than the programmatic [Ref. 12], Dexter states that
Congressmen interviewed generally indicated that they were
not inclined to raise or consider questions of military
policy in terms of its meaning for some national or inter-
national political objective or goal (It should be noted
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that Dexter conducted his interviews in the years prior to
1969) . In referring to military policy, Dexter meant
decisions dealing with the relationship of weapons, person-
nel, organization, and administration to foreign policy,
national interests and purposes and societal values and
objectives. Some of his more revealing quotes include:
"In fact how do we (committee) members know what
should be considered? We mostly reflect what
the military people recommend; military policy
is made by the Department of Defense" [Ref. 12,
p. 376].
"We don't have a lot before our (Armed Services)
committee. There's really much scarcity of
policy legislation . . . Maybe we have given too
much authority to the Secretary of Defense and
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress itself has
promulgated legislation which says to them —
use your own judgment" [Ref. 12, p. 380].
"The Appropriations Committee is concerned
mainly not so much with legislation as
avoiding accountable waste. As to getting
into the policy field, there its members
have no clear viewpoint of whether they
should or should not" [Ref. 12, p. 381]
.
Edward J. Laurance has done extensive work on the
changing role of Congress in the Defense decision-making
process [Refs. 24 & 25]. His findings indicate that Congress
has become increasingly more concerned with Defense policy,
particularly since 1968, which would suggest a programmatic
orientation.
3 . Studies Utilizing Content Analysis
Several studies have employed the technique of
Content Analysis to determine patterns of Congressional
budgetary decision making. Ira Sharkansky used Content
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Analysis to evaluate the relationship of a House Appropria-
tions Subcommittee toward four non-defense agencies which
came under its jurisdiction [Ref . 29] . His primary objective
was to determine how the subcommittee divided its supervisory
and control efforts among the four agencies and how this
affected the budget requests submitted by the agencies. He
based his analysis on subcommittee hearings, subcommittee
reports, and agency budget requests over a span of years
from 1949 to 1963. His unit of analysis was the questions
asked of agency officials by subcommittee members during the
hearings. These questions were coded into certain cate-
gories depending on their subject matter. Sharkansky found
that the subcommittee members often relied on the agency
officials to provide cues during the hearings about items
worthy of questioning. Stating that his study provided a
systematic collection of data about the behavior of an
Appropriations Subcommittee, Sharkansky concluded that the
subcommittee members did indeed vary their oversight activity
among the agencies. He found that the subcommittee "devoted
more than the average amount of supervision and control
efforts to the agencies that spend the most money, whose
requests have increased the most rapidly, and whose behavior
toward the subcommittee has deviated most frequently from
subcomittee desires" [Ref. 29, p. 628]. Sharkansky further
indicated that his study had shown the practicality of using
Content Analysis of appropriations hearings to devise indexes
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of committee behavior and that this method could have wider
application in a systematic study of legislative-executive
relations.
James E. Jernberg also used Content Analysis to
study the interaction between several House Appropriations
Subcommittees and five non-defense agencies under their
control [Ref. 17]. His investigation sought to determine
whether there was a relationship between the use of program
terms in the presentation of budgets and supplementary
information and the types of questions asked of agency
representatives during the hearings. Jernberg stated that
it would seem reasonable to expect that the types of
questions asked by a committee would reflect their informa-
tion orientation. The questions asked were originally coded
into 37 categories, later reduced to four major categories:
Program, Objects of Expenditure, Oversight of Administration,
and Other. Jernberg concluded that, "the primary purpose of
the appropriations hearings is to serve the subcommittee's
search for confidence in the agency and in their own pre-
dispositions. The subcommittee's need is to feel assured
that either the amount requested is the appropriate amount
to be granted, or that their previous patterns of behavior,
(e.g. cut a little, grant request, or increase request)
should prevail" [Ref. 17, p. 111].
Using the technique of Content Analysis, Leo A.
Lukenas analyzed the actions of the House Appropriations
Committee in the area of Defense Procurement budget requests
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during the period fiscal years 1970 through 1973 [Ref . 23]
.
Lukenas characterized the activity of the committee on the
basis of the reasons given for its decisions on the indivi-
dual line item elements of the Defense Procurement appropri-
ation. The justification given for particular committee
decisions were identified and assigned to one of seven
categories of reasons. Lukenas' categories included:
(1) Improper request, (2) Service adjustment, (3) Reduced
requirement, (4) Financial adjustment, (5) Special subcom-
mitee action, (6) No reason cited, and (7) Conformance with
authorization. Lukenas concluded that most House Appropri-
ations Committee decisions dealing with Defense Procurement
during the period studied were fiscal in nature rather than
programmatic. He also noted that the role played by the
"Authorization Committees" seemed to show an increasingly
more important impact on the budgetary process.
Larry W. Blackmon applied Content Analysis to a
greater extent than did Lukenas in his evaluation of the
budgetary behavior of the Senate Armed Services Committee
toward Defense Procurement in the fiscal year 1968 - 1974
timeframe [Ref. 4]. His purpose was to determine whether
the Senate Armed Services Committee behaves in a fiscal
manner — directing its efforts at improving defense manage-
ment or efficiency, or whether it behaves in a programmatic
manner — trying to shape the nation's defense policy. Like
Lukenas, Blackmon chose the decision for budget changes as
the unit of analysis most appropriate for coding in the
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committee budgetary process. Committee reports were examined
and the decisions given were ultimately placed into one of
three major categories: (1) Programmatic, (2) Fiscal, or
(3) Other. In summarizing his findings, Blackmon stated
that the predominant behavior pattern of the committee
appeared to be fiscal in nature, but that the overall trend
of programmatic activity was one of a steadily increasing
nature. He found that although the number of fiscal actions
exceeded those of a programmatic nature by a factor of three,
the absolute dollar value of the fiscal actions was 60% less
[Ref. 4, pp. 39 & 43]. Blackmon also noted that Content
Analysis had demonstrated to be a useful tool in determining





The following synopsis of Content Analysis (CA) was
taken from Berelson [Ref. 2], Holsti [Ref. 16], and Lasswell,
Leites and associates [Ref. 22]
.
A. DEFINITION
Content Analysis as a research design is a plan for
collecting and analyzing data in order to answer an investi-
gator's questions. A good CA research design develops
explicit procedures for selecting a sample of data for
analysis, content categories and units to be placed into
the categories, comparisons between categories, and the
classes of inference which may be drawn from the data. In
short, a good CA design ensures that theory, data gathering,
analysis, and interpretation are integrated. Other defini-
tions of CA include the following:
"Content Analysis is a multipurpose research method
developed specifically for investigating any problem
in which the content of communication serves as the
basis of inference" [Ref. 16, p. 2].
"Content Analysis is the statistical semantics of
political discourse" [Ref. 16, p. 2]
.
"Content Analysis is a research technique for the
objective, systematic, and quantitative description
of the manifest content of communications" [Ref. 2,
p. 18].
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
When applying CA to a research problem, several assump-
tions must be made. These include: (1) CA assumes that
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inferences about the relationship between intent and content
or between content and effect can validly be made. (2) CA
assumes that study of the manifest content is meaningful.
The content analyst assumes that the "meanings" which he
ascribes to the content, by assigning it to certain catego-
ries, corresponds to the "meanings" intended by the commu-
nicator and are understood by the audience. (3) CA assumes
that the quantitative description of communication content
is meaningful. This implies that the frequency of occur-
rence of various characteristics of the content is itself
an important factor in the communication process [Ref. 2,
pp. 18-20].
The need for a clearly formulated problem and for fully
stated, dependent hypotheses is essential. In CA relatively
few ideas are discovered in the actual process of analysis.
The hit-or-miss method of analyzing "everything" in a body
of content in the hope that "something will turn up" is
seldom productive, and is certainly uneconomical since CA
can be a time consuming process. If the problem is not
clarified to the point where several worthwhile hypotheses
or questions can be formulated, then the projected analysis
should be abandoned.
C. DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS
The two criteria of objectivity and a systematic approach
imply that the investigator use well thought out rules and
procedures. The use of an explicit set of rules minimizes
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the possibility that the findings reflect the analyst's
subjective predispositions rather than the content of the
documents being studied. A systematic approach eliminates
analyses in which only materials supporting the investigator's
hypotheses are admitted as evidence. To distinguish it from
simple information indexing, CA must have theoretical
relevance. All CA is concerned with comparison, the type of
comparison being dictated by the investigator's theory.
Content Analysis should also be quantitative. More impres-
sive results can be drawn if CA yields numerical data.
Content Analysis proves useful when data accessibility
is a problem and the investigator's data are limited to
documentary evidence or when restrictions of time and space
do not permit direct access to the subjects of research.
The analyst must be careful of his own intuition when using
CA. While intuition may be important in some stages of
research, especially in formulating the problem, it is not
a substitute for objectivity or for the evidence present.
Content Analysis will be useful whenever the problem requires
precise and replicable methods for analyzing those attributes
of documents which may escape casual scrutiny.
In a CA framework, all communication is composed of six
basic elements: a source or sender, an encoding process
which results in a message, a channel of transmission, a
detector or recipient of the message, and a decoding process.
Figure 1 is a schematic representation of these six elements
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Content Analysis is used most frequently to describe
the attributes of messages. The investigator may compare
documents derived from a single source in several ways
including a comparison of messages over time, across
different audiences or in different situations. Theories
may also be tested by comparing the messages produced by
two or more different sources. Usually the purpose is to
relate theoretically significant attributes of communication
to differences in the messages they produce.
Coding in CA is the process whereby raw data are system-
atically transformed and aggregated into units which permit
precise descriptions of relevant content characteristics.
The rules by which this transformation is accomplished serve
as the operational link between the investigator's data and
his theory and hypothesis. Coding rules are thus a central
part of the research design.
As equally important as coding rules are the categories
into which the data is coded. Choice of categories, units
of analysis, and systems of enumeration represent three
interrelated decisions which every content analyst must make
in light of his specific research problem. There is some-
thing of a progression in the design of CA. The hypotheses
derive from the nature of the problem and in a sense help
to refine it. The general categories for analysis are
contained in the hypotheses and they in turn are translated
into concrete, specific indicators for purposes of the
actual analysis. The actual results are then generalized
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and applied to the level of the categories and thus consti-
tute a test of the hypotheses under investigation.
Content Analysis succeeds or fails based on its cate-
gories. Some general principles of category construction
include the following: (1) The most important requirement
of categories is that they must adequately reflect the
investigator's research question. The analyst must define
clearly the variables he is dealing with and he must specify
the indicators which determine whether a given content datum
falls within the category. The analyst must decide on how
fine are the distinctions he wishes to make within categories
Subdivisions within categories permit the analyst to make
more comparisons. (2) The second general requirement — that
categories be exhaustive — means that all relevant items in
the sample of documents under study must be capable of being
placed into a category. (3) The requirement of mutual exclu-
siveness stipulates that no content datum can be placed in
more than a single category. (4) Independence of categories
means that assignment of any datum into a category not affect
the classification of other data. (5) The rule that each
category must be derived from a single classification
principle stipulates that conceptually different levels
of analysis must be kept separate.
If possible categories should be standardized. The
advantages of standardization are the same as in any area
of scholarship, namely that results may be compared across
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studies and findings will tend to become cumulative. In
the absence of standard schemes of classification, the
analyst is usually faced with the task of constructing appro-
priate categories by trial and error methods. This process
consists of moving back and forth from theory to data,
testing the usefulness of tentative categories, and then
modifying them in light of the data. Among the types of
categories used frequently in CA research are the following
examples: subject matter (most frequently used), direction,
standards, values, ends and means, traits, and verbal
interaction.
In addition to defining the categories, the analyst must
designate the recording units of analysis that will be
placed in a given category. Almost all CA studies have used
one of five units: (1) The single word or symbol is generally
the smallest unit that has been used. (2) The theme, a
single assertion about some subject, is the most useful
unit of CA. (3) The central character as recording unit
has been used in studies of fiction, drama, movies, etc.
(4) Sentence or paragraph structure has only been used
sparingly. (5) The item is usually too broad a unit for
most studies and has only been used occasionally.
In deciding how to analyze his data and findings, the
analyst must also choose the system of enumeration he will
use. The most widely used method of measuring character-
istics of content is frequency, in which every occurrence
of a given attitude is tallied.
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Two other criteria of CA must be present — reliability
and validity. If research is to satisfy the requirement
of objectivity, measures and procedures must be reliable,
i.e. repeated measures with the same instrument on a given
sample of data should yield similar results. Opportunities
for enhancing reliability in CA are generally restricted
to improving categories. Category reliability depends
upon the analyst's ability to formulate categories "for
which the empirical evidence is clear enough so that compe-
tent judges will agree to a sufficiently high degree on
which items of a certain population belong in the category
and which do not" [Ref. 16, p. 136]. A solution to the
problem of low reliability is the introduction of additional
judges to broaden the base of consensus. Validity is usually
defined as the extent to which an instrument is measuring
what it is supposed to measure. Choice of categories and
content units similarly enhance or diminish the likelihood
of valid inferences about the data.
Also, most CA studies cannot escape making sampling
decisions. Often the abundance of material is great and
the analyst is restricted by time — he either obtains his
data by sampling or does not obtain it at all.
Content Analysis has proved to be a valuable research
method in many areas of inquiry, however, three disciplines
have accounted for approximately 75% of all CA research:
Sociology-Anthropology (27.7%), General Communication
(25.9%) and Political Science (21.5%) [Ref. 16, p. 21].
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IV. APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
A. METHODOLOGY
As stated in the introductory chapter, the main purpose
of this thesis was to determine the fiscal/programmatic
orientation of Congress through an analysis of the Congres-
sional budgetary decisions affecting the Defense Budget.
The Congressional committees having the most direct impact
on the Defense Budget and the committees evaluated were:
the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the House
and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Department of
Defense, and the House and Senate Committees on the Budget.
The various Conference Committees of the House and Senate
involved in the budgetary process were also included in the
analysis. The specific portions of the Defense Budget
chosen for evaluation were Procurement and Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) . This study was
limited to an analysis of the fiscal year 1976 and fiscal
year 1977 Defense Budgets, the first two years covered by
the new Congressional budgetary process as prescribed by
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974. The research technique employed was Content Analysis
as defined and described in Chapter III. The methodology
also built on that used by Lukenas and Blackmon [Refs. 23 & 4]
The specific steps followed were: (1) identification of
documentary material that represent an accurate, explicit
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indication of committee behavior, (2) isolation of some
unit of analysis that can be categorized for further
analysis, (3) development of appropriate categories for
use with the unit of analysis, (4) coding and verification
of categories, and (5) inferences based on the above
processes [Ref . 4] . Also included in the methodology were
the six basic elements of communication as described by
Holsti: a source or sender, an encoding process which
results in a message, a channel of transmission, a detector
or recipient of the message, and a decoding process [Ref. 16]
.
B. DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL
The primary data sources used for analysis were the
published Reports of the House, Senate, and Conference
Committees on Armed Services [Refs. 35 through 40] , and the
Reports of the House, Senate, and Conference Committees on
Appropriations for the Department of Defense [Refs. 41
through 46] . In the case of the House and Senate Budget
Committees, the documents evaluated were the First and
Second Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget [Refs. 47 through
58] .
The Reports and Resolutions , which are published after
the various committees hold hearings, conferences, and
markup sessions, are excellent summaries of the major actions
taken and decisions made by the committees. Both the
Reports and Resolutions are available to anyone with
access to an official government depository such as the
library of the Naval Postgraduate School.
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Supplemental data sources included the Congressional
Quarterly Almanac [Ref. 8] and Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Reports [Ref. 9]
.
C. UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND DATA RECORDING
After obtaining all documentary material, the next
step in the methodology was to isolate and record some
unit of analysis that could be further categorized and
evaluated. The research of Lukenas and Blackmon [Refs. 23
& 4] demonstrated that an appropriate unit of analysis was
the "reasons given for committee decisions on individual
line items." After an initial preview of the House and
Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committee Reports
,
it was decided to continue with this unit of analysis. A
somewhat different approach had to be taken in evaluating
the Resolutions of the Budget Committees. This approach
will be described in the Summary of Findings chapter.
An indepth analysis of the Reports for fiscal years
1976 and 1977 was undertaken, and the committee decision for
each individual weapon system or program (e.g. Condor Missile,
B-l Bomber , Nuclear Strike Cruiser, XM-204 Howitzer, etc.)
contained in the Procurement and RDT&E appropriation titles
was recorded. A committee decision was defined to be the
reason given for: (1) recommending full approval of funds
requested, (2) changes in dollar amounts (+ and -) requested,
(3) the deletion of an entire program, or (4) the occasional
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restoration by the Senate Appropriations Committee of
funds cut by the House Appropriations Committee.
The individual recording of committee decisions was a
time consuming process, but necessary for this type analy-
sis. In all 829 committee decisions were recorded on work-
sheets. The decisions were separated on the worksheets by
committee and Procurement and RDT&E. It would be impracti-
cal to list all 829 decisions here; however, several typical
decisions and the worksheet format used are illustrated in
Appendix A. Even though the worksheet includes the par-
ticular Service and the dollar amounts involved, no attempt
was made to determine the most or least affected Service
in a monetary sense.
D. CATEGORY DEVELOPMENT
The next step, and probably the most important, was the
development of categories in which to place the units of
analysis. The basic problem in the thesis was to determine
if the various committees' actions affecting the Defense
Budget were fiscal or programmatic in nature. Therefore,
the working hypotheses or final categories became Fiscal
and Programmatic. The fundamental definition and structure
for these two categories was taken from Korb [Ref . 21]
.
After recording and evaluating the committee decisions,
14 original or subcategories were developed. During this
subcategory development, particular attention was given to




The final categories with their subcategories were
defined as follows:
1. Fiscal Category
This category included those decisions that reflected
committee efforts to eliminate waste and inefficiencies.
The primary concern of the committee was to reduce Defense
spending and this was often accomplished with percentage or
across-the-board reductions. There was very little con-
cern expressed for overall Defense policy or program
composition.
a. Cost
This subcategory included those systems that
the committee considered to be not cost effective or economi-
cal. Key words and phrases were "costly", "expensive",
"system worth not equal to funds expended", "inexplainable
costs", "cost growth", "cost overruns", "government and
contractor cost estimates different." The committee was
concerned with eliminating wastes and excessive expenditures
by prohibiting duplication of programs. The committee felt
that a reduced funding level would be adequate.
b. Improper Request
This subcategory included requests that the
committee felt were under the wrong title or line item.
The committee could not determine a need or requirement for
the funds requested. The requested percentage increase
was too large in the committee's opinion. The committee
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felt that it was improper to buy a new piece of equipment
when a present one could be modified at a lower cost. The
committee considered that funds requested were not required
at this time since the system would not be procured until
a subsequent fiscal year — reductions in this case were an
attempt to reduce undesirable reprogramming actions. The
committee determined that funds from a previous year had
not been used and should be expended before more funds were
approved.
c. Program Management
The committee felt that the management of the
program contributed to waste and inefficient use of funds;
consequently, a reduction was in order. The committee
believed that better management would result in a more
favorable price, cost, etc.
2. Programmatic Category
This category included those decisions that reflected
committee efforts to shape Defense programs and specific
weapons systems to conform to desired committee policies,
goals, and directions concerning National Defense. The
committee was less concerned with total spending and more
concerned with strengthening the force structure, deter-
mining the types and numbers of weapons systems, increasing
capabilities, improving technology, etc.
a. Force Structure/Effectiveness
This subcategory included those committee deci-
sions that expressed a concern for force level, structure,
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effectiveness and readiness posture. Committee actions were
often an atempt to influence particular inventory levels.
b. Force Modernization
The committee was genuinely concerned with
force modernization and demonstrated an expressed desire
for technically improving equipment considered obsolete or
inadequate to meet a threat.
c. Developmental
Actions under this subcategory were an attempt
by the committee to be able to make a decision based on a
firm, unquestionable system; the committee wanted to be cer-
tain as to what kind of system it was buying. Key words and
phrases included "premature request", "development incomplete",
"further study, testing, design, operational evaluation, etc.
needed", "schedule slippages due to technical/developmental
problems." The decision contained a committee preference
as to system characteristics, specifications, engine manu-
facturer, type, etc.
d. Planning/Justification
The committee felt that the planned use for the
system was incorrect. Also the Service had presented no or
inadequate justification for the system. The expressed
committee concern under this subcategory was for the system/
program itself, not the funds requested. The committee
felt there was no requirement or need for the system.
This subcategory was originally included under the





The committee felt that the system was needed
to strengthen tactical capabilities. Committee decisions
were motivated by the requirement to meet an opposing
tactical threat. Often the committee stated that another
system would satisfy the tactical requirement better than
the system for which funds were requested.
f. Strategic Program
Reasons given for decisions under this subcate-
gory were very similar to the tactical subcategory only
referred to as strategic in nature. Committee actions were
attempts to improve strategic programs or strengthen
strategic capabilities. Several decisions were concerned
specifically with affecting the strategic Triad: Missile
Submarines, Bombers, and ICBM's.
g. Foreign Policy
The committee expressed a concern for the affects
of Defense policy on international treaties, commitments,
alliances and the perceived role of U.S. forces on the
world scene. The committee desired to maintain an indepen-
dent U. S. technological base regardless of NATO actions.
Even though Congress supported NATO alliances, the committee
would not approve actions that adversely affected U. S.
Defense posture and capabilities,
h. Congressional Policy
The committee decision contained words directing
that a particular Congressional procedure, policy, plan be
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followed. The request for funds was in direct violation
of an expressed policy of Congress.
3. Other Category
After recording all the committee decisions, it was
determined that a third final category would be needed.
Decisions in this category did not appear to represent true
committee initiatives. This category was termed "Other" and
included three subcategories.
a. Department of Defense Action
The committee's decision (usually reduction of
funds or cancellation of program) was identical to some
previous action taken or request made by DOD or one of the
Services.
b. Conforms to Authorization
This subcategory applied to the Appropriations
Committees. It was not possible to determine the House/
Senate Appropriations Committee fiscal/programmatic direction




Decisions were assigned to this subcategory when
no reason was given or it was impossible to determine the
committee's fiscal/programmatic nature. Blackmon [Ref. 4]
in his analysis of the Senate Armed Services Committee
assumed a "worst case" and if no reason for a decision was
given, it was coded as fiscal. Contrary to Blackmon and in
order to prevent any personal bias from entering the analysis,
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this study coded "no reason" decisions under the Other
category.
Figure 2 illustrates the three final categories with
their subcategories and the abbreviations used for coding.
E. CODING AND VERIFICATION OF CATEGORIES
The next step in the methodology was to code the units
of analysis (committee decisions) using the subcategories
and final categories developed. Initially the decisions
given by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on
the Procurement and RDT&E titles for fiscal year 1976 were
2
assigned to one of the original 14 subcategories. Before
proceeding with the coding of the remaining committee
decisions, it was felt that the reliability and validity of
the categories should be tested. This was accomplished
through a verification process.
A Category Verification sheet was prepared which included
a brief synopsis of the fiscal/programmatic hypotheses and
25 typical committee decisions. Seven persons disassociated
with the analysis were briefed on the objective of the study,
Content Analysis technique and the fiscal/programmatic
hypotheses. These seven persons or independent judges were
then given a verification sheet and asked to code the
decisions as fiscal or programmatic.
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For 20 out of 25 or 80% of the decisions there was
total agreement between the author's original coding and the
seven independent judges. For one of the decisions, five
judges agreed with the original coding and two disagreed.
On another of the decisions, six judges agreed with the
original coding with only one in disagreement. The coding
of these two decisions was considered to be in sufficient
agreement with the original coding for the purposes of this
study. This brought the total agreement in coding to 22
out of 25 decisions or 88%.
An interesting thing occurred on the other three deci-
sions. For two of these decisions, six of the judges disa-
greed with the original coding and one agreed. On the third
decision, all seven judges disagreed with the original
coding. These three decisions involved committee statements
as to the justification, planning, need, or purpose for a
system or program. Decisions such as these had originally
been coded by the author as Fiscal under the Planning/
Justification subcategory. The verification process had
indicated that a majority of independent judges considered
these decisions to be Programmatic in nature. The original
coding of these decisions was therefore changed from Fiscal
to Programmatic.
Upon completion of the verification process, it was felt
that the reliability and validity of the categories had been
proven sufficiently enough to code the remaining recorded
decisions on the worksheets.
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Appendix B illustrates the Verification Sheet format
with the original coding, coding by the seven independent
judges, and final coding of the 25 sample decisions.
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V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
A. FRAMEWORK FOR DISPLAY
In order to draw inferences from the recorded deci-
sions, some system of enumeration and display had to be
developed. A table was prepared for each committee dis-
playing the number of decisions coded as fiscal, programmatic,
or other by fiscal year (FY) and appropriation title. A
bar graph was also prepared for each committee showing the
fiscal, programmatic and other categories as a percentage
of the total committee decisions.
B. HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
The format of the House Armed Services Committee Report
was well suited for application of the Content Analysis
technique. Most of the decisions for the Procurement title
were found in sections entitled "Discussion of Major Weapons
Procurement Programs" or "Committee Comment On Specific
Programs." The FY77 Report had a lengthy discussion of
the Navy's Shipbuilding and Conversion programs. The RDT&E
sections of the Reports were very well organized. Each
individual weapons system or program was followed by




HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE DECISIONS
Category
Fiscal Programmatic Other Total


















Grandtotal 47 54 101
Table 3
The above table indicates that committee decisions regarding
the Procurement title were more programmatic in both FY's.
For the RDT&E title the committee was clearly more fiscal
in FY76 but fairly evenly divided between fiscal/programmatic
in FY77. Across both titles, the committee was slightly more
fiscal in FY76 and more programmatic in FY77. Overall for
the two year period, the committee's orientation was more
programmatic by a percentage of 53.5 to 46.5.




















C. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
The format of the Senate Armed Services Committee
Report was the best of all the committees for applying
Content Analysis. Programs under both the Procurement and
RDT&E titles were separated by Service (e.g. Army Aircraft,
Air Force Missiles, Navy Torpedoes, Army Tracked Combat
Vehicles, etc.). Individual line item decisions in the
Procurement title were found in sections entitled "Committee
Recommendation for Changes." Line items in the RDT&E title
contained paragraphs entitled "Committee Recommendations",
"Background", "Committee Considerations", and "Basis for
Committee Action."
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE DECISIONS
Category
Fiscal Programmatic Other Total
Procurement 17 16 1 34
FY76 RDT&E 4 21 1 26
Subtotal 2T 37 2 60
Procurement 11 13 1 25
FY77 RDT&E 13 21 34
Subtotal 24 34 1 59
Grandtotal 45 71 3 119
Table 4
This table indicates that committee decisions in the
Procurement title were almost evenly divided in both FY's.
For RDT&E the committee was more programmatically oriented
in each FY. Consequently, the committee displayed an overall
programmatic orientation with a percentage of 59.7.
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D. HOUSE/SENATE ARMED SERVICES CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
The Procurement section of the Conference Committee
Report followed the format of the Senate Armed Services
Committee Report by separating programs according to
Service; however, the RDT&E section did not. Neither sections






Fiscal Programmatic Other Total


























This table indicates that the Conference Committee decisions
regarding the Procurement title were more fiscal in FY76
and more programmatic in FY77. The RDT&E decisions were
more programmatic in both years. Across both titles, the
committee was more fiscal in FY76 but clearly more pro-
grammatic in FY77. Overall the Conference Committee dis-
played a programmatic orientation which coincided with the
findings for the individual committees. More "no reason"
decisions were found in the Conference Report than the
individual committee Reports . This finding would tend to
indicate that the Conference Committee engaged in less
discussion and review of programs than the individual
committees.





























E. HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
The House Appropriations Committee Report included
decisions on many more programs than either of the Armed
Services Committee Reports since the Appropriations
Committee also approves funds for programs that do not
require authorization and review by the Armed Services
Committees. Committee decisions in both the Procurement
and RDT&E sections of the Report were separated by Service.
Most decisions in the Procurement section were found in
paragraphs entitled "Committee Recommendations." There
was no special paragraph designation in the RDT&E section.
The overall orientation of this committee differed from the
previous committees, as can be seen in the following table.
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE DECISIONS
Category
Fiscal Programmatic Other Total
Procurement 31 51 24 106
FY7 6 RDT&E 62 38 23 123
Subtotal 93 89 47 229
Procurement 34 24 3 61
FY77 RDT&E 28 24 6 58
Subtotal 62 48 9 119
Grandtotal 155 137 56 348
Table 6
The committee displayed more of a programmatic orientation
toward the Procurement title in FY7 6; however, all other
committee decisions were more fiscal in nature. Overall
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the committee was more fiscal with a percentage of 44.5.
It's interesting that the committee did not display even
more of a fiscal orientation due to the following statement
found in an introductory section of the FY76 Report : "The
committee does not recommend changes in the overall defense
policies presented by Administration witnesses. The reduc-
tions recommended are based on management improvements
which the committee feels will both reduce waste and enhance
our national security posture" [Ref . 43, p. 9] . Contrary
to this statement, the committee did deal with policy issues
and demonstrated a fairly strong programmatic nature.
















F. SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
The Senate Appropriations Committee Report proved to
be very difficult to work with and not well suited to the












in the Procurement and RDT&E sections concerning committee
actions. The few specific reasons given were usually found
in an introductory section entitled "Items of Special
Interest. " The Senate Hearings on Department of Defense
Appropriations for FY76 and FY77 were reviewed, but very
little was found in the Hearings to disclose final committee
decisions on specific programs. The Congressional Quarterly
Almanac and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports were
helpful in determining committee decisions on some major
weapons systems. Due to the sketchy information, the
Procurement and RDT&E titles are combined in the following
table.




Fiscal Programmatic Other Total
Procurement 2 6 2 10
and RDT&E







This limited information indicates that the Senate
Appropriations Committee was more programmatic in nature
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The Senate Appropriations Committee Report for FY7 6
stated that the Subcommittee on Department of Defense
Appropriations held 39 separate hearings between February
12, 1975, and October 21, 1975, which produced 14,000 pages
of transcript [Ref. 42, p. 10]. Likewise the Subcommittee
on Department of Defense Appropriations for FY77 began
hearings on February 2, 1976, and concluded them on June
24, 1976, after 22 separate sessions producing 15,000 pages
of transcript [Ref. 45, p. 8] . From this it would seem that
the Senate Appropriations Committee spent a considerable
amount of time and effort reviewing the Defense Budget.
However, due to the very limited amount of information found
in the Reports concerning committee decisions made on individual
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programs, one would have to question the actual depth and
extent of review to which the Defense Budget was subjected
by this committee. As a matter of procedure, final review
of the Defense Budget by the Senate Appropriations Committee
usually occurs after budget formulation by the House and
Senate Budget Committees, authorization action by the House
and Senate Armed Services Committees and appropriation action
by the House Appropriations Committee. It would appear from
the data available that the Senate Appropriations Committee
has allowed these other committees to take the initiative
in making decisions on the Defense Budget and has taken a
less active role in scrutinizing budget requests.
Traditionally the Senate Appropriations Committee has
acted as an appeals board for agencies which have had their
budget requests reduced by the House Appropriations Committee.
In both the FY76 and FY77 Reports
,
the Senate Appropriations
Committee complimented the Department of Defense for the
prompt manner in which it provided detailed appeals of
House actions [Refs. 42 & 45, pp. 13 & 11]. Table 7 above
contains 35 individual committee decisions. Twenty-six
of these decisions were found in the committee Reports and
the nine remaining decisions were obtained from the Congressional
Quarterly Almanac . Of the 26 decisions found in the Reports
,
eight of these or 31% involved a Senate Appropriations
Committee restoration of funds cut by the House Appropriations
Committee. It can only be speculated as to how many fewer
decisions would have been made by the Senate Appropriations
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Committee if there had been no appeal action by the
Department of Defense.
G. HOUSE/SENATE APPROPRIATIONS CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
There was not much data in the Conference Report with
which to determine the fiscal/programmatic orientation of
the Conference Committee. For most of the individual pro-
grams, the content of the Report merely stated that the
conferees had agreed on the House or Senate recommendation
or had decided on some mutually acceptable budget amount,
but gave no other reason for their decision. This would
indicate that most of the Conference Committee decisions
were some type of compromising action between the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees rather than being primarily










































The above table suggests that for the programs for which a
specific reason was given the Conference Committee was
evenly divided between fiscal/programmatic. This is logical
since the House Committee had been more fiscal and the
Senate Committee more programmatic in thinking. The high
incident of "no reason" decisions is evident from the
relatively large numbers included under the Other category
and also from Figure 8. Of the 56 decisions included under
the Other category, 41 or 73% of them were coded as no
reason. For the remaining 15 decisions in the Other cate-
gory, the only reason given was that the budgeted amount
conformed to authorization. This further suggests that
not a great deal of discussion concerning the fiscal/ pro-
grammatic aspects of most programs occurs during the Con-
ference Committee sessions.


























H. COMMITTEES ON THE BUDGET
As was mentioned earlier a different methodology was
necessary in analyzing the Budget Committees. The Budget
Committees deal with the Federal Budget on an aggregate or
macro-economic level. They are concerned with overall
federal revenues, deficits, the public debt, and budget
authority and outlays. Beginning with the FY77 Federal
Budget, the Budget Committees recommended budget amounts
for 16 major functional categories such as National Defense,
Agriculture, Commerce and Transportation, Health, etc.
The Budget Committees do not break the Defense Budget
down into appropriation titles such as Procurement and
RDT&E. Neither do they specify recommended amounts for
individual weapons systems and programs. Therefore in
applying Content Analysis to the Budget Committees, it was
not possible to use committee decisions on individual line
items as the unit of analysis. After studying the content
of the Resolutions , it was decided to record statements
and comments found in the Resolutions which would suggest
the fiscal/programmatic orientation of the particular committee
This procedure revealed, that in actual practice, the handling
of the Defense Budget by the Budget Committees in FY76 and
FY77 was more fiscal in nature, but there appears to be a
strong potential for a future shift to a more programmatic




1. House Budget Committee
The following statements suggested a fiscal
orientation in reference to National Defense:
"Committee assumes financial adjustments which
can be accomplished by use of funds available
from prior years accounts, sale of equipment
which does not need replacement to foreign
governments, adjustment of stock fund balances,
reduction in foreign military credit sales, and
lower inflation rates than those contained in
the President's budget based on latest pricing
trends" [Ref. 47, p. 21].
"Reductions in Defense area were mainly for
following reasons: (1) there are sufficient
funds within the total to support decisions,
(2) result of revised inflation estimates,
(3) financial adjustments" [Ref. 49, p. 4].
"The Committee recommends an overall reduction
in the DOD budget of $1,324M in budget authority
and $545M in budget outlays. The Committee did
not consider individual line items in arriving
at this estimate, but rather examined the rates
of growth in purchase, inflation rates, and
the large and growing unexpended balances
currently available to the Department which
may become available for transfer under existing
procedures from appropriated purposes and used
in lieu of new budget authority for funding
programs proposed in the budget. To the extent
that unobligated balances of prior-year funds
cannot be identified in significant amounts
during the course of appropriation review, the
national defense budget authority totals for
fiscal year 1977 may have to be increased above
the levels specified herein [Ref. 53, p. 31].
Views of Hon. Robert N. Giaimo
"My views of the situation, therefore, leads me
to conclude that in this period of harsh
budgetary constraints, the estimates for national
defense will be adequate ..." [Ref. 47, p. 78].
"I want to express my concern about the amount of
money allocated to the National Defense function.
I think it is too high. I am convinced that
$112B in one year is not justified. In my
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opinion, we will set in motion a defense pro-
curement rate that will be difficult to curb
and control. That, in effect, will result in
waste and inefficiency" [Ref. 53, p. 107].
Views of Hon. Elizabeth Holtzman
"This resolution . . . would commit the country to
a massive and unjustified increase in military
spending. This resolution contains wasteful and
inefficient programs" [Ref. 53, p. 127].
"Rep. Holtzman complained that the new budget
process was more an arithmetical exercise in
toting up the requests of the President and
actions of appropriations committees than it was
a Congressional effort at setting national
priorities" [Ref. 8, p. 920].
The following comments suggested a potential for
programmatic orientation by the House Budget Committee:
Views of Several Minority Committee Members
"We are concerned by the seemingly cavalier
treatment accorded our national defense needs
by the Committee. While we believe that some
cuts can be legitimately supported, excess
cuts in the defense program for reasons of
short-term fiscal expediency are dangerous if
they lead to significantly reduced readiness
of our forces. The broad brush treatment given
to program growth could result in unduly down-
grading our defense effort" [Ref. 47, pp. 94-96].
Views of Hon. Robert L. Leggett
Congressman Leggett referred to the need to review
more closely individual programs such as B-l, F-16,
F-18, Trident, Attack Helicopters, and Cruise
Missiles [Ref. 53, p. 113].
Views of Hons . Burleson, Landrum, and Runnels
These Congressmen spoke of need to review force
structures, inventory levels, modernization of
naval forces and balance between nuclear weapons
and conventional weaponry. In referring to the above
items they stated, "we strongly oppose any reductions
in funding for our Nation's defense at this time"




2. Senate Budget Committee
The following statements suggested a fiscal
orientation.
"In National Defense the first budget resolution
sought implementation of administrative and
legislative economies ..." [Ref. 57, p. 6].
"The Committee did not examine all of the major
policy issues raised by the programs in this
functional area (National Defense) in order to
arrive at recommended outlay and budget authority
limits" [Ref. 48, p. 44].
"The Budget Committee 'intends to meet its responsi-
bility under the Budget Act to review congressional
spending actions and recommend measures to reconcile
revenue and spending actions with appropriate fiscal
policy" [Ref. 48, p. 3].
"The Committee is not persuaded by the arguments in
the President's budget that 1976, a year of extra-
ordinary fiscal strain, must be the year of major
initiatives to expand or recoup foregone defense
investment. The recommendations reflect an adjust-
ment for a more realistic 10 percent rate of
inflation" [Ref. 48, p. 43].
"In general these functional totals are intended to
represent broad priorities, and do not imply judge-
ments as to the mix of programs which the authori-
zing committees and Appropriations Committee may
subsequently wish to include within the established
targets" [Ref. 54, p. 2].
Views of Senator Alan Cranston
"Although there are numerous cases to be made, I do
not believe the Budget Committee is the appropriate
forum to debate the merits of particular weapon
systems, foreign military sales, or other specifics.
There is huge real growth in the defense budget
request approved by the Budget Committee. I see no
valid reason for it. I believe it should be cut by
$3.5B from the level of the Committee Resolution"
[Ref. 54, p. 120].
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The following statements suggested a potential for
programmatic orientation by the Senate Budget Committee:
"The Committee considered using a mission approach
to assess the content of the defense budget. Such
an approach would allow the total resources devoted
to each major defense mission to be considered in
light of foreign policy requirement and defense
strategy. The Committee looks forward to working
with the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees in developing such a mission framework"
[Ref. 48, p. 44].
"The Committee voted unanimously to require the Defense
Department to be prepared to discuss its fiscal 1978
budget requests in terms of specific missions that
would be accomplished and the relation of those
missions to U.S. interests in the world at large and
in various areas of the world. It is the Committee's
judgement that without such mission oriented budget
discussions, it is not possible effectively to
analyze the relationship between military spending
and U.S. objectives and other priorities" [Ref. 54, p. 3]
"Mission area budgets will provide the Committee with
a valuable tool for analyzing military activities
and proposed purchases and comparing these proposals
with military and foreign policy strategies and
requirements" [Ref. 54, p. 21].
Views of Senators James L. Buckley and James A. McClure
"The Budget Committee should avoid placing a rigid
ceiling on the FY 1977 defense budget ... Rather,
attention should be devoted to the FY 1978 defense
budget for it is here that the Congress can have a
direct influence over the entire composition of the
U.S. defense posture. An opportunity would be
provided to deliberate over the nature of U.S. foreign
policy, commitments and the nature of the military
forces we should deploy to support them. Long-range
decisions could be taken which would provide the type
of quidance which makes for intelligent defense
planning . . . Such long-term planning on the part of
the Budget Committee would provide a smoother
integration of effort with the responsive substantive
committees (Armed Services and Defense Appropriations)
... We believe the Budget Committee can bring about a
vast improvement in governmental decisionmaking in
defense and other areas by looking into longer term
projections on which to base their annual
recommendations" [Ref. 48, p. 152].
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Views of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
"Our defense strategy and budget should be
developed in the context of our foreign policy
and security. Our foreign policy and our military
force structure should be interrelated. During
its deliberations the Committee has tried to probe
the relationships between international events and
the level of our armed forces with little success.
Without such guidance, it is difficult to measure
the true needs for defense. I hope the Committee




A. FISCAL OR PROGRAMMATIC
It would have to be concluded from this study that for
the period FY76 - FY77 Congress, through its committee
budgetary process, was fairly equally divided between a
fiscal and programmatic orientation in relation to the
Defense Budget. Overall the Armed Services and Appropria-
tions Committees demonstrated a slightly more programmatic
nature; however, the fiscal nature of the Budget Committees
tends to balance out the overall Congressional fiscal/
programmatic orientation.
Figure 9 combines all the recorded decisions of the
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees and illus-
trates the overall fiscal/programmatic orientation of
these committees.


























Figures 10 and 11, respectively, illustrate the com-
bined Armed Services and Appropriations Committee decisions
by Procurement and RDT&E titles.













































Figure 12 shows the distribution of the combine
Armed Services and Appropriations Committee decisio;
3
subcategories used in the Content Analysis.
It can be noted from Figure 12 that if Blackmon's
[Ref. 4] criteria of coding "no reason" decisions as fiscal
were applied, the overall orientation of the committees
would shift to Fiscal — 50%, Programmatic — 44%, and
Other - 6%.
This study supports Lukenas 1 [Ref. 23] finding that the
House Appropriations Committee is predominately fiscal in
nature. Blackmon [Ref. 4] in his study of the Senate Armed
Services Committee concluded that the orientation of the
committee was primarily fiscal, but the overall trend of
programmatic activity was one of a steadily increasing
nature. This study found that the Senate Armed Services
Committee was more programmatic which would tend to support
the increasing programmatic nature of Blackmon's finding.
In the ever changing role of Congress it could be
assumed from this study that Congress has reached a fairly
stable fiscal/programmatic level in dealing with the Defense
Budget. Congress is still keenly concerned with eliminating
3The total percentages for the Programmatic and Other
Categories in Figure 12 are different from those shown in
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waste and reducing spending, but is also beginning to
more of a desire to influence overall Defense policy a\
individual program goals. This study suggests that wit-
nesses testifying before Congress on the Defense Budget
must be thoroughly familiar with both fiscal and programmatic
aspects of a weapons system or program. These witnesses
must be able to support and defend all cost elements as
well as being able to explain how a program affects force
readiness, inventory levels, and the requirement for the
weapons system to meet any present or perceived enemy
threats.
B. IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT
CONTROL ACT OF 1974
Probably the greatest impact of the Budget Act is the
general feeling that Congress has regained some of its
lost power over the federal purse. Through passage of the
First and Second Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget , the
Budget Committees establish overall targets and ceilings
to guide the other committees as they consider requests
for funding. Neither house of Congress may take any action
which will cause spending to exceed the budgeted level.
The impact of the Budget Committees was clearly demon-
strated on August 1, 1975 when Senator Edmund S. Muskie,
Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, succeeded in having
the Armed Services Committee Conference Report on the FY76
Budget rejected on the Senate floor by a vote of 42 - 48.
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The Report / said Muskie, "will inevitably bust the budget
target for national defense" [Ref. 8, p. 365]. Senator
John C. Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, said that it would be "unthinkable" to send the
committees back to conference; but that is exactly what
happened. A second Conference Report was presented and
finally approved by the Senate on September 26, 1975
[Ref. 8, p. 378].
The House Appropriations Committee expressed the
influence of the Budget Act through the following state-
ment: "The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 increased the role of the Congress in budget
and fiscal policy making and required additional attention
to total federal spending. Because the Defense Department
budget accounts for a significant part of all Federal
expenditures, the Committee was especially careful to
assess the results of its recommendations on DOD budget
outlays" [Ref. 41, p. 13].
The House Armed Services Committee also expressed con-
cern for the new budget procedures: "To make the necessary
detailed recommendations to the Budget Committee this year,
the Committee on Armed Services has had to examine the
total Defense budget request more extensively than in the
past. The committee is recommending a revision of proce-
dures next year which will require annual authorization
prior to appropriation for all military functions adminis-
tered by the Department of Defense" [Ref. 38, pp. 14-15].
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All provisions of the new budgetary timetable were not
fully implemented until processing of the FY7 7 Budget;
however, several committees felt the "pinch" of the
timetable in both FY76 and FY77. Following are several
comments indicating this:
FY76 Armed Services Committee
"For the first time this year, the committee had
to work within the procedures established by
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The
committee substantially met the deadline of
May 15 for reporting the military authorization
bill, although it required a great deal of
effort and compression of schedule" [Ref. 36, p. 4].
FY77 Armed Services Committee
"The committee met the deadline of May 15 for
reporting the military authorization bill,
although it was very difficult and required a
great deal of intense effort. In particular,
the committee had to mark up prior to the final
passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution
and therefore wihout full knowledge of the
final Defense Budget targets. The schedule set
forth in the Congressional Budget Act is diffi-
cult to maintain and ought to be reviewed"
[Ref. 39, pp. 6-7].
FY77 House Appropriations Committee
"The accelerated appropriation bill schedule man-
dated by the Budget Control Act precluded the
Committee from waiting for final authorization
action before marking up the Defense Appropria-
tion Bill. There are probably programs for
which the Committee is recommending funds
which will not be authorized" [Ref. 44, pp. 4-5].
The FY7 6 Defense Appropriation Bill was not signed by
the President until February 10, 1976, a date considerably
after the start of the fiscal year on July 1, 1975. Con-
gress successfully met its new timetable in 1976 and
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completed action on the FY77 Defense Appropriation Bill
on September 13, 1976, prior to the start of the new fiscal
year on October 1, 1976. The Bill was signed by the Presi-
dent on September 22, 1976 [Ref. 9, p. 2629]. This was
the first time in years that a Defense Appropriation Bill
had been passed prior to the start of the fiscal year.
It will be interesting to observe if Congress can continue
to meet its established budgetary timeframes.
The Congressional Budget Office was created with
high expectations; however, the Congressional Quarterly
Weekly reported on June 5, 1976 that "in its year and a
half of existence, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
has lived up to almost none of these expectations" [Ref.
9, p. 1430] . Nevertheless an impact of the CBO will be
felt by the Defense Department. A newspaper article in
the San Jose Mercury on December 30, 1976, gives an example
of the impact of the CBO on the Defense establishment. It
stated, "The Congressional Budget Office suggested Wednes-
day that the Army was buying the wrong type of helicopter
and planning to form the wrong kind of division if it is
expected to fight a short, intense war in Europe. The CBO
study said Congress must re-examine some of the expensive
weapons procurement plans of the Army" [Ref. 1]. The CBO
could prove to be a strong influence on Congress as it
makes its decisions concerning the Defense Budget.
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C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study was only a small part of the continuing
effort to observe the changing role of Congress as it
acts to shape Defense policy. It was suggested that Con-
gress has reached somewhat of an equilibrium in its fiscal/
programmatic orientation. Future studies of individual
committees as well as Congress as a whole will be needed
to determine if this trend will continue or if Congress
will shift to a more heavily fiscal or programmatic nature.
It will be interesting to study Congress 1 handling of
mission area budgets beginning with the FY79 Defense Budget,
The present and future impact of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 197 4 was only briefly
analyzed in this thesis. Further research on the signifi-
cance of the Budget Committees and other provisions of
this Act will be needed. Studies should be conducted on
the Congressional Budget Office and individual committee
staffs to determine the influence of these support activi-
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